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2Development Cooperation is not the sole preserve of the government. More than anything
else, our experience over the last few decades has taught us that the government and the
private sector have a joint role to play in the fight against poverty. And so I am delighted by
this guarantee fund initiative from the Belgian Raiffeisen Foundation and the Cera
Foundation, which is wholly in line with the Fair Trade Guarantee Fund set up by the Belgian
government.
As we can see from this book, the guarantee fund is an interesting financial instrument that
allows people to take part in an economic process. However, the free market economy and
globalisation are the dominant forces today. If the process of globalisation is allowed to
develop without political guidance, the gulf between rich and poor will surely widen further.
People running small farm holdings, along with ordinary workers, officials, and the organi-
sations to which they belong, will be considered uncreditworthy and suffer further eco-
nomic marginalisation.
The fight against poverty means more than promoting economic growth in the context of
sustainability. If our development policy is to tackle poverty with any degree of success, it is
important that we give people the opportunity to become involved in their own develop-
ment. This means that economic growth must go hand in hand with the creation of sustai-
nable employment, with healthcare and educational facilities, with promoting social orga-
nisations, with fair wages, and with concern for vulnerable groups.These are all aspects of a
more social economy, one in which people are central, and yet one which pays due consi-
deration to our planet’s sustainable environmental limits.
A financial instrument that can offer people dignity and future prospects is well worth deve-
loping further, as I am sure you will agree. So I invite you to read on.Together, let us turn our
thoughts to the issues that face us today, so that we can make guarantee funds even more
of a success tomorrow.
Eddy Boutmans
Belgian State Secretary for Development Cooperation
F o r e w o r d  b y  E d d y  B o u t m a n s
3This book was written in response to a seminar on guarantee funds organised by
the Belgian Raiffeisen Foundation (BRS) in 2001. In theory, these funds appear to
be a perfect financial instrument. When savings and credit organisations in deve-
loping countries approach commercial banks in their own countries, they are
often unable to obtain credit. Generally, this is because they have little to offer in
the way of collateral. In these cases, an external guarantee could help mobilise
financial resources in the South. Over time, every guarantee fund expects to see a
relationship of trust emerging between the savings and credit organisation and
the local banking sector.
When we speak of “savings and credit organisations” in this book we refer to
organisations in the microfinance sector whose services are aimed at the low-
income populations of the South. In the first chapter we place this microfinance
sector in context. Guarantee funds have been around for a great many years. In
the second chapter we describe the various models to be found in the literature on
this subject.
We find that guarantees do not work nearly as well in practice as the theories
would have us believe. During the seminar, several organisations with practical
experience were seeking answers to the main stumbling blocks. In the third chap-
ter we take a closer look at their points of view regarding a number of core issues.
We, the BRS, wish to take to heart these recommendations, and contribute active-
ly by making available a guarantee fund. In the final chapter, you will find more
details on this fund.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
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h o p e  f o r  t h e  f u t u r e
f o r  p e o p l e  i n
d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  ?
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7CONTEXT
The annual report of the World Bank informs us
that 2.8 billion people, or almost half of the 
world’s population, are living on less than 2 USD
a day. No fewer than 1.2 billion people are living
on less than 1 USD a day! Much hope, probably
too much hope, has been pinned on the micro-
finance sector as a means of redressing this
inequality.
This chapter does not set out to give a full break-
down of the sector, which has many aspects.
However, we wish to cover some of its major cha-
racteristics, which are important for gaining a
better idea of the role played by guarantee funds
later.
BANKING:
A QUESTION OF TRUST
The organisations that provide worldwide finan-
cial services are many and varied.They vary from
traditional savings and credit groups (e.g. tontin-
es or roscas
1
) to commercial banks with interna-
tional outlets. In between, we find a number of
other structures, such as associations, cooperati-
ves, local credit institutions, village funds, deve-
lopment banks and non-government organisa-
tions.
Though these organisations may operate and
organise themselves in many different ways,
they are all focused on the same underlying con-
cept - confidence. In essence, a financial institu-
tion should be a “place of trust”. The bank plays
the role of intermediary in a market driven by
the supply of and demand for financial resour-
ces. And indeed, the people and organisations
that provide these financial resources, in the
form of savings or capital, trust that the bank will
convert their money into loans and other invest-
ments safely.
In an ideal world, financial institutions would
operate on the basis of trust and nothing else. In
practice, every organisation puts procedures and
resources in place to control, apply pressure to,
and cover themselves against the risk of finan-
cial loss.
1 A tontine (French) or rosca (English) is essentially a (temporary) group of people whose members regularly contribute to
a collective fund. Each member of the group can expect all or some of this collective fund to rotate around in his favour.
For a detailed publication on the various informal systems see “The poor and their money, an essay about financial services
for poor people”, Stuart Rutherford, University of Manchester, 1999. Also available via www.devinit.org/findev/papers.htm
8The main method of achieving this in cooperati-
ve structures is social control between the mem-
bers of the organisation.
The more formal banking structures rely on real
(mortgage) collateral to cover themselves
against bad loan repayments. As a result of the
criteria this involves, credit is usually only availa-
ble to those who already have money. According
to these standards, most of the world’s popula-
tion is not creditworthy.
WHO IS SERVICED BY
THE MICROFINANCE SECTOR?
In general, the microfinance sector provides
financial services for people who do not have
access to commercial banks because of their
socio-economic profile. These are poor people,
with no fixed income, who are unable to offer
material collateral.
However, the threshold is not purely financial - it
is physical and social too. In developing coun-
tries, commercial banks are practically non-
existent in rural areas. The distances between
these areas and the cities are enormous, and tra-
vel is expensive. Even when banks are close to
the lower-income populations of a city, the gap
in living environments and cultures is usually
much too great.
In this context we should not view a poor person
too narrowly as a person without money. Having
no access to financial services is just one aspect.
In practice, access to insurance systems, health-
care and education is also limited. This is why
microfinance institutions (MFIs) develop broader
(social) activities. However, expectations may not
be set too high. MFIs will never offer a total solu-
tion to problems of a social nature.They work on
the basis of financing, and financing is merely a
means of contributing to greater equality.
This vision of the role open to financing organi-
sations is not a recent one. It was voiced more
than a century ago by people like Schultze-
Delitzsch, Desjardins and F.W. Raiffeisen. The lat-
ter founded the cooperative rural savings and
credit system in Western Europe and was seen as
a social reformer at the same time.
9A FEW CHARACTERISTICS
OF MICROFINANCE
One well-known MFI is the Grameenbank in
Bangladesh.This “bank of the poor” was set up in
the 1970s by M. Yunus who was convinced that
fighting world poverty is a question of (political)
will rather than financial resources. Like F.W.
Raiffeisen, he took the position that charity is no
solution, for it affords poor people little in the
way of initiatives to improve their situation.
History has shown that self-awareness and a
sense of self worth on the part of the borrower
are just as important to an MFI’s success as good
financial management.
Since microfinance institutions deal with custo-
mers who constitute too much of a risk for the
commercial banking circuit, it is only logical that
they should put other mechanisms in place to
develop a stable organisation with
affordable services for its customers.
Two characteristics common to
nearly all MFIs are the proximity
principle and social control.
Most organisations operate in a
decentralised manner. Not only are
they close to the customer in the
geographical sense - they are close
in the social sense too.The MFI’s wor-
kers are familiar with the local com-
munities, and often come from the
community itself. Obviously, when
selecting these workers, it is essenti-
al that they enjoy the trust of that
community. This proximity is also essential if the
organisation’s finances are to be adequately
managed.
Since little use is made of formal guarantees, it is
important to exercise social control in the matter
of repayments and in the organisation’s financial
management. This solidarity, or, to put it more
appropriately, social pressure, is even stronger
when group credit is involved. Responsibility for
repayment then rests with the group. In many
MFIs, group members cannot receive credit until
the last loan has been paid off.
MFIs also invest in training, not only for their own
personnel, but also and more particularly for
their customers. These training programmes
usually cover the activity for which the loan was
requested. They involve modules such as book-
keeping, technical training, sales techniques, and
so on.
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When working with groups, there are courses on
group techniques, conflict resolution, admi-
nistrative management, rights and duties of
group members, articles of association, etc.
Some institutions go even further and offer lite-
racy programmes. These skills increase the re-
payment rates under the lending programmes.
However, they also represent an expense that
cannot be fully accounted for in the cost of the
loans, and for which the MFIs rely on external
subsidies. In recent years the clear trend has
been to achieve a structural separation between
financial and non-financial activities. This has
happened not only under the impulse of donors,
who have sought clarity over the financial viabi-
lity of the organisations they support, but also
under the impulse of legislators in the different
countries.
There was little recognition of the microfinance
industry until 15 years ago, and the authorities
sought solutions through normal banking cir-
cuits. Microfinance activities were classed as
“informal financing” or “non-institutional finan-
cing” - a parallel financial circuit subject to little
in the way of official regulation or control. In the
meantime, we have come to realise that these
structures could in fact channel financial resour-
ces to the more vulnerable groups (e.g. Pronaf
loans in Brazil2). At the same time, there has been
a recognition that better regulation and supervi-
sion is needed to protect the small saver and
borrower. Another motivating factor is the
potential for governments to generate income.
This is why specific legislation has been imple-
mented in many countries (Tanzania, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Cameroon, etc.). The sector itself rea-
lises that a shift towards the formal banking cir-
cuit is a necessary step towards institutional
sustainability. One such move would be to intro-
duce more transparency from the outside. In this
context we can equally state that much has been
done in recent years to evaluate the sector more
uniformly, thereby facilitating mutual compar-
isons3.
LOANS: THE MOST 
COMMONLY KNOWN FINANCIAL
PRODUCT IN MICROFINANCE
The most commonly known financial product is
the loan. Loans are usually given for productive
trade, crafts and agricultural activities. Short-
term in the main, they vary from a few months to
one or two years.
Some organisations provide loans for housing
over five to ten years, but these are fairly unusu-
al. Most MFIs focus on trade and crafts.
Agriculture is particularly risky because of clima-
tic conditions, limited product life and fluctua-
2 Under a special credit line known as Pronaf, the Brazilian government channels subsidised agricultural loans for farming
families via micro-lenders such as Cresol (cooperativas de crédito rural com interaçao solidario) in the state of Parana.
3 “European Initiative for Performance Evaluation of African MFIs” was coordinated by the NGO ADA (Luxembourg). More
information available from www.adaceremlux.lu/programme_pilote.htm. An interesting document in this context is the note
published by CGAP on financial transparency in MFIs: www.cgap.org/html/p_focus_note22.html
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ting market prices. Agricultural loans have to be
tailored to seasonal income and expenditure
cycles, whereas most MFIs operate with weekly
and monthly repayment schemes. It is clear that
the sector will also have to develop custom pro-
ducts, and that the MFIs will have to specialise
according to the target groups with which they
work.
The rates of interest applied by MFIs are higher
than those in the formal banking sector but
lower than those of the “loan sharks”.
There is little point in comparing MFI rates
against those of the formal banking sector
because the poorer target groups barely have
access to these formal loans in any case. As we
are dealing with smaller sums and more intensi-
ve monitoring, it is only logical that the costs and
interest rates would be higher than those
applied by the commercial bank. As a rule MFIs
generate very small profits, and simply covering
the operating costs
4
is already viewed as a posi-
tive outcome. However, profits are needed if
sustainability in the long term is to be guaran-
teed. The challenge
facing the MFI is to
maintain profitability
without losing sight of
the original, poorer




However, it does make
sense to draw a com-
parison with the rates
of the “loan sharks”.
Usually, these are private individuals who offer
loans without a great deal of formality, but
whose interests rates can be up to ten times hig-
her than normal banking rates. They may also
frequently be described as unscrupulous.
However, it is worth noting that these private
moneylenders continue to operate even when a
local MFI is offering an affordable alternative.
They do so because their procedures are shorter
and cheaper. For example, they set fewer extra
demands in terms of checks, training and wai-
ting time. In addition to these objective factors
there is the element of “certainty”. Many MFIs
have failed due to an overly social stance, bad
4 Operational and financial expenses 
management or a restricted size, and so confi-
dence in them has suffered a setback. It is to be
expected that borrowers will spread their bets
and move away from the private moneylenders
only gradually.
In addition, the demand for loans is far greater
than the MFIs can supply at present. In the run
up to the world microcredit summit in 2002, it is




Alongside credit facilities, the provision of
savings facilities is at least every bit as important.
Even the poor can and wish to save; they lack
only the possibility, not the capacity. For people
with little in the way of money and only limited
access to insurance and external financial
resources, it is even more important that their
savings be properly managed. People can save in
different ways, and not necessarily in money.
People on low incomes usually resort to alterna-
tive methods of saving because the normal
financial structures will not accept their savings.
They can save in land, livestock or jewellery, or
deposit their cash savings with another for safe-
keeping.
The cooperative organisations place a heavy
emphasis on saving and it is not infrequently the
case that savings are required for access to loans.
These cash savings perform several functions. To
the saver they offer a buffer against unforeseen
12
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outlays, as well as access to loans. Safety is ano-
ther reason for saving with a financial institution
- not just to prevent loss or theft, but to prevent
oneself and other members of the family from
squandering the money on lower priority items.
For the financial institution, these cash savings
form a substantial and often cheap source of
financial resources. In this case the concepts of
confidence, control and good management are
even more important, since this is the hard-
earned cash of a vulnerable group that will be
extremely hard hit if the organisation fails. The
organisation needs even greater banking exper-
tise and must take pains to ensure the solvabili-
ty and liquidity of the MFI. If it is set up as a non-
governmental organisation (NGO) the MFI will
be unable - from the legal point of view - to
mobilise and convert savings to loans. However,
it does have the power to block savings tempo-
rarily as a means of guaranteeing the credit
given. This actually freezes the financial resour-
ces, which are all too scarce, and should be avoi-
ded in a sector where surplus savings already
enter circulation only sporadically. Development
programmes give MFIs cheap financial resources
in the form of donations or cheap loans. Despite
this, however, credit volume is usually limited
compared with the demand for loans.
OTHER IMPORTANT SERVICES IN
THE MICROFINANCE SECTOR,
SUCH AS INSURANCE
Traditional savings and credit systems usually
function as insurance mechanisms too. In so-cal-
led tontines - where the members take it in turn
to use the money collected - the group will con-
tribute extra if one of the members is faced with
an unforeseen expense, such as illness or a death
in the family. This social function also remains a
feature of MFIs. Although they mainly provide
loans for productive income-generating activi-
ties, their customers’ needs are more varied than
this. Financing is also needed for education and
healthcare, and unforeseen social activities. MFIs
must turn their attention to these financing
requirements too. It makes no sense to ignore
them, because the customer will fund these
expenses with his productive credit, or turn to
the private lender and in this way enter a vicious
circle of debt.
Customer training programmes on the issue of
loans and savings remain necessary not just for
the sound operation of the organisation itself,
but also as a means of strengthening the custo-
mers’ capacities.
Saving programmes (even compulsory savings),
which provide a buffer against unforeseen cir-
cumstances or non-productive investments, are
an important service offered by any financing
organisation.
In the last five years we note a clear tendency to
develop specific insurance products that tie in
with the capacities of MFIs. For example, these
insurance policies may take on the debts left
behind when someone dies (balance of debt
insurance) or compensate the relatives for a loss
of income, by paying school fees for children. In
healthcare too, efforts have been made to tie in
the workings of the mutual health funds with
the vision of the cooperative MFIs.
The need for “microinsurance” is great, but expe-
rience in the field is limited. Since insurance is
based on the law of numbers, so as to spread the
risk, these organisations should have a reach
that is as wide as possible, either through their
own growth or by working with other organisa-
tions.
CONCLUSION
Microfinance is by no means “banking on a small
scale”, and it is more than a bundle of financial
transactions. MFIs offer financial services which
commercial banks are unable to provide, by
working with customers who are not creditwor-
thy (read profitable) according to the standards
imposed by the established structures. To make
management affordable they use control
mechanisms, such as social control via group
loans. Their place must be as an alternative to
private lenders, who sometimes charge extre-
mely high rates but at the same time operate
quickly and with the minimum of formalities.
Organisations in the microfinance industry play
a social role. Saving and credit systems represent
a way of giving large groups of low-income ear-
ners a chance to live a better quality of life. This
requires more than money.
Capacity building and guidance are every bit as
important. These costs cannot simply be passed
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on to the borrowers alone. A certain level of sub-
sidy is needed. In recent years the tendency has
been not to keep everything in the same struc-
ture, but to put banking activities aside in a spe-
cialist organisation. It is generally accepted now
that this service provision, i.e. pure microfinance,
can be developed in an economically viable
manner. It is important for these organisations to
operate within a framework of external control -
not only does this increase the confidence of the
customers, but it improves the
transparency towards the organisa-
tions that support them. It is not
desirable for all the services made
available to the poorer target
groups to be housed under one and
the same roof. After all, it is not pos-
sible to be a jack of all trades. There
is clearly more recognition and inte-
rest from the commercial banking
sector in the financial area. However,
there is still a wide gulf, along with
distrust on both sides. So the aim must be to pro-
mote a mutual exchange, in order to meet the
demand for microcredit. Guarantee funds can be
an appropriate instrument in this context.
2W H AT  I S   
A  G U A R A N T E E  F U N D ?
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WHAT IS A GUARANTEE FUND
AND WHY IS IT NEEDED IN THE
MICROFINANCE SECTOR?
A guarantee is a financial instrument used to
protect a credit institution (usually a commercial
bank) against a borrower who fails to repay his
loan. The guarantee is an irrevocable promise by
the guarantor to the lender: if the borrower does
not repay the loan, the guarantor will meet the
borrower’s obligations in full or in
part. In this way the guarantee
fund covers the losses incurred by
the credit institution that have
resulted from lending. When de-
signing an instrument of this type,
it is crucial that the risk be spread
between the three parties invol-
ved: the guarantee fund, the credit
institution and the guarantee hol-
der.This prevents a lack of discipli-
ne creeping into the repayments.
It is known that smaller companies, even though
they may have good economic prospects, find it
difficult to obtain bank credit. In most develo-
ping countries the traditional financial structures
(mostly banks) tend to refuse to grant loans to
microenterprises. The banks view the risk as too
high. Potential borrowers are unable to demon-
strate their creditworthiness by means of proper
accounts or a previous credit history, and are
unable to offer the bank sufficient collateral. A
microfinance industry has been created alongsi-
de the formal financial structures, aiming preci-
sely at microenterprises, which are usually infor-
mal in nature. The MFIs have usually built up
their portfolios through donor funds. However,
these donations are limited in size. In recent
years the microfinance sector has mushroomed,
and it is on the lookout for extra sources of finan-
cing. However, the capital market views MFI fund
applications with the same distrust as the com-
mercial banks show for microenterprises.
It is within this context that the mechanism of
the guarantee fund is gaining ground. The gua-
rantee fund makes the risk of granting credit to
“unknown” borrowers acceptable to the lenders.
Thus the guarantee mechanism offers valuable
potential for linking the existing financial chan-
nels to a new group of customers.
MFIs and other organisations are viewed as high-
risk because many aspects of their business are
unknown to the banks. This is known as asym-
metry of information, and it always carries the
risk of abuse of confidence. After all, the borro-
17
wer is much more aware of his own creditworthi-
ness than the lender. Therefore the trust of the
lender is open to abuse if a borrower presents
his creditworthiness as being better than it actu-
ally is. This phenomenon is known as free riding.
The use of a guarantee fund can be a stimulus for
commercial banks to lend directly to microenter-
prises, or to provide a credit facility for an MFI.
Operating “on-the-job”, the guarantee fund aims
to obviate the need for itself on the long term. It
is counting on the fact that bringing the various
parties together can create a better understan-
ding, through which the bank can trust in its new




The guarantee fund clearly meets a need. And
yet this mechanism is not without controversy
and its fair share of adversaries. Until the mid
1990s, the view prevailed that guarantee funds
were of no use and were actually inefficient. On
closer inspection it was seen that this conviction
rested on negative experiences with guarantee
funds utilised to back subsidised agricultural
loans in developing countries. These public gua-
rantee funds were widespread in the 1970s and
1980s. They had a centralised structure, which
led to bureaucracy and inadequate manage-
ment. Moreover, these guarantee funds were
dependent on the state budget. Political influen-
ces weighed heavily. By the end of the 1980s,
18
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most of the schemes had been bled dry through
corruption and free riding.
In the early nineties we saw the second “genera-
tion”of guarantee systems. In recent decades the
chronic shortage of credit financing for smaller
companies has occupied a more prominent
place in development policy (in the North and
South). There was a need for mechanisms that
create new points of access to the institutional
credit market.The guarantee mechanism appea-
red to be a useful tool in furthering these rela-
tions, and new models were developed.
These new models attach a great deal of impor-
tance to matching the prevailing market prices,
repayment discipline, and spreading the risks
between the parties. They are designed to bring
more trust into the relationship between the cre-
dit institution and the borrower. The greater the
The decline of the public guarantee system
in developing countries: an illustration
An example from India illustrates the loss of the public guarantee system in developing countries. In
the 1980s, two guarantee funds were created under the umbrella organisation of the Deposit
Insurance and Credit Guarantee Association (DICGA): one for small-scale industrial enterprises, and a
second for other, small-scale lending. In addition, special lines of finance were provided for the 
banking sector, to offer loans in these segments.
Participation in these systems was compulsory for all large Indian banks. For loans under 25,000
rupees (about 580 euros) the system was free of charge and covered 90% of the credit sum. For loans
exceeding this amount, a fee of 0.5% was charged, with identical cover of 90%. At a later stage this
percentage was reduced to 60%.
The banks made massive use of the finance for directed credit, and of the guarantee funds linked with
them. A guarantee was automatically linked to every approved loan. And guarantees were called in
automatically: as a soon as a bank wrote off a loan, and all attempts at collection appeared fruitless,
the claim was automatically processed. The system operated so smoothly that when granting a loan
most banks would fill in the claim forms in advance, so that they would be ready to send off at the
appropriate juncture.
In 1995 the claims backlog at DICGA had run up to 4.2 million. Finally, in 1999, the entire banking sec-
tor withdrew from the system and DICGA was forced to wind up.
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trust, the fewer the risks to be covered by the
guarantee fund.
But even with this new generation a number of
old problems have resurfaced. The most notable
is probably that of moral hazard, which occurs
when a bank tries to offload its riskiest loans on
the guarantee fund, and is lax in monitoring the
repayments. Other problems include stiff proce-
dures for securing a guarantee (with loss of
time), and limited refinancing possibilities for
guarantee funds that have met with repayment
problems.
A FEW MODELS
OF THE GUARANTEE FUND
Several models of guarantee fund stimulate the
formal financial sector to lend money to
microenterprises. Of the second generation of
guarantee funds described above there are
three models worth mentioning. These models





The agreements reached between these parties
determine the type of model.
The individual guarantee model
In the individual model we note a direct agree-
ment between the guarantee holder, the gua-
rantor and the bank.The guarantor - the guaran-
tee fund - screens individual entrepreneurs (or
farmers) seeking to approach a credit institution
(bank) for credit with the help of a guarantee.
The guarantee fund and the bank work under a
co-operation agreement in which they split, on
a percentage basis, the risk associated with a
given credit application. By way of guarantee
the guarantee fund gives the bank a letter of cre-
dit covering its percentage. The bank assesses
the credit application, according to its own cri-
teria this time.
It can now take account of the reduced risk affor-
ded by the guarantee. If it approves the loan, an
individual contract is drawn up between the bor-
rower and the bank.The diagram below summa-
rises the relations involved.
The guarantee holder pays the guarantee fund a
commission, which is calculated as a percentage
of the amount given in the guarantee. The bank
can collect and pass on these commissions. If the
borrower defaults, the guarantee fund is bound,
on the basis of the letter of credit, to repay the
bank its guaranteed share of the credit.
The portfolio guarantee
Under this model, the guarantee fund no longer
screens the individual guarantee holders. The
guarantee fund arranges with the bank to gua-
rantee a certain group of potential borrowers. In
real terms they set out a number of criteria for
customers and/or credits. The undertaking to
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provide a guarantee for these credit requests is
fixed in advance.
The criteria relate to the borrowers’ characte-
ristics, credit ceilings, the purpose of the loan, the
selection and assessment of credit applications,
arrangements over the guaranteed percentage
of the credit sum, the procedures for settling
guarantees and handling disputes. Through this
the guarantee fund can be certain that the exact
target group it specifies, e.g. informal entrepre-
neurs, is making use of this credit line. The dia-
gram below summarises the relations involved.
In this model the guarantee fund is much less
involved with the guarantee holders. All loans
meeting the criteria are automatically covered
by the agreed percentage. Sometimes a borro-
wer is hardly aware that he is also the guarantee
holder. The costs are calculated into the loan
repayment scheme and the bank passes them
















Individual entrepeneurs or farmers,
meeting a predetermined profile
Guarantor Credit institution
The intermediary guarantee model
In the third model, use is made of intermediary
organisations, which are better placed than the
financial institutions to provide microenterprises
with credit at an affordable price.These interme-
diary organisations are generally MFIs.
In this scheme the guarantee fund guarantees
the bank the credit line that an MFI uses. These
funds enable the MFI to extend the volume of its
credit portfolio for microenterprises.The MFI has
its own methodology for granting microcredit
and is in a position to carry out these transac-
tions cost-efficiently. The MFI is responsible for
recovering the microcredit it grants.The diagram
below summarises the relations involved.
The guarantee offered by the guarantee fund
assures the bank that the credit will be repaid if











Intermediary organisation = MFI
Individual entrepeneurs or farmers
Micro credit
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The individual guarantee and credit portfolio
guarantee models have no effect on one of the
main obstacles behind the shortage of loans for
microenterprises. It is indeed true that they pro-
vide a solution to the shortage of guarantees
that can be offered by the smaller businesses
themselves. However, there is an equally impor-
tant problem: transaction costs that are high for
volumes that are small. For example, where
administration costs are concerned, there is little
difference between a loan of 1,000 euros and a
loan of 100,000 euros. When, as a result of offe-
ring all this microcredit, a credit institution is for-
ced to take on extra staff and managers, this has
a direct effect on profitability. These two models
have had only a limited effect, therefore, in ope-
ning the doors to credit for microenterprises.
A major advantage with the intermediary model
is that the bank itself does not have to develop
new credit products to tackle a little known mar-
ket. The MFI is already familiar with the market
and with this type of service. Moreover, its inter-
nal organisation has taken shape through the
cost structure specific to microcredit. This makes
it well suited to covering the costs of granting
microcredit. Obviously, this type of credit invol-
ves higher costs than ordinary bank loans.
Systems other than the guarantee mecha-
nisms described above can help smaller
businesses gain access to credit. A promi-
nent example is the mutual guarantee asso-
ciation (MGA). The main characteristic of
the MGA is that the guarantee holders are
all members of an association. The mem-
bers contribute to a fund that offers guar-
antees. The mutual aspect is a reference to
the common link between the members of
an association. This association is usually a
professional association.
All members are liable for loans guaranteed
by the MGA. In some countries this mecha-
nism is widespread. In Italy, for example,
there are about 700 MGAs, known as
Confidi, spread over just about every sector
of the economy. When assessing a guaran-
tee application these MGAs do not confine
themselves to the financial dimensions, but
look at the personality of the applicant,
technical qualifications (which a profes-
sional organisation is well placed to do),
and the location.
In the EU, the European Commission has
been supporting MGAs since 1991. Expe-
rience in this area has been studied by the
International Labour Organisation and the
findings disseminated beyond the borders
of the Union. At present MGAs are still in




Within the models described, a variety of gua-
rantee mechanisms can be selected.
The subsidiary guarantee
A subsidiary guarantee relates only to a portion
of the credit, i.e. that part which cannot be gua-
ranteed by the guarantee holder’s own securi-
ties. It can only be called upon after the guaran-
tee holder’s own securities have been used. In
this set-up the bank and the guarantee fund
always share the risk, which stimulates the bank
to monitor the loans.
The extra subsidiary guarantee
This is a mechanism which, like the latter, requi-
res the guarantee holder to provide a part of the
guarantee, but where the loan is repaid through
several capital repayments. The guarantee runs
only until the extra part of the bond is strictly
required, or, in other words, until the repayments
have brought the outstanding loan below the
level of the borrower’s own securities.
The joint and several guarantee
The guarantee fund can also take joint and seve-
ral responsibility vis-à-vis the bank for the repay-
ments. Should the loan fall into arrears, the bank
will be entitled to claim repayment in full from
the guarantee fund.
Some international networks of MFIs (such
as ACCION, Women’s World Banking, Finca)
have their own guarantee fund. They bring
together MFIs from all continents, but the
majority comes from Latin America. As and
when affiliated MFIs grow into formal
financial institutions, they find more direct
connections with the local capital markets.
This presents the challenge of searching
for new applications for guarantees, and of
designing sophisticated financial instru-
ments that meet the altered needs of the
network. In Bolivia the well-known MFI,
BancoSol, a member of the ACCION net-
work, used guarantees to issue its own
bonds and offer these on the local capital
market. In this way BancoSol was able to
attract funds from local investors and use
these for the purpose of lending.
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type in the inter-
mediary model.
WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES
AND DISADVANTAGES
OF GUARANTEE MECHANISMS?
A guarantee fund offers a number of clear ad-
vantages and disadvantages.
The main advantages are the following:
• It builds a structural link between small lenders
and the formal financial sector.
• It increases the quantity of credit financing
available for microenterprises.
• The fund creates additionality, or, in other
words, it stimulates banks to offer credit to a
sector that would not normally have access to
formal bank loans without this mechanism.
• It initiates a learning process by which the ban-
king sector learns to make a more accurate
assessment of the risks associated with gran-
ting credit to microenterprises.
• The mechanism can act as a lever for converting
scarce donations into broader microcredit
funds.
• The exchange rate risk can be taken from the
equation for the guarantee holder and gua-
rantor alike.The mechanism allows us to stimu-
late lending from a strong currency environ-
ment to a country with a weaker currency.
In the long term there may be other advantages
for the actual process of granting credit, such as
better loan conditions, longer periods, lower
guarantee requirements and possibly lower
rates of interest.
However, the critics of the guarantee fund point
to the following disadvantages:
• The very high cost of collecting information on
the guarantee holders, analysing this informa-
tion and following it up. This means that most
guarantee funds find it very difficult to cover
their costs.
• The issue of a guarantee makes the bank a little
less inclined to monitor its loans with care. It
can lead to a certain degree of laxity, which
opens the door to abuse.
• In addition to the normal credit risks guarantee
funds are also open to abuses such as free riding
and moral hazard. This can mean that the repa-
yment rate on guaranteed loans can be lower
than originally foreseen.
• Covering losses can considerably erode the size
of a guarantee fund.
• The mechanism does not operate well under
some macro-economic conditions. When the
local financial sector is lacking in liquidity, a
guarantee fund cannot stimulate banks to
grant credit.
• The costs are rarely charged on the basis of the
risk that each party runs, and so the weaker par-
ties to the agreement are forced to carry dis-
proportionately high costs.
• There are doubts over the additionality argu-
ment.
It has also been pointed out that a guarantee
does not always ensure access to credit. Other
elements, such as an influential director who can
open a few doors, are often needed to ensure
that an agreement is reached.
A FEW KEY ELEMENTS
IN THE DESIGN OF A SUCCESSFUL
GUARANTEE FUND
Clear objectives
In the first place we aim for a certain degree of
additionality by placing a group, which has been
excluded until now, within reach of credit.To this
end the guarantee
mechanism should redu-
ce the obstacles that pre-
vent access to the financi-
al channels. It may be
easier and more efficient
to work with selection cri-
teria rather than individu-
al applications. On top of
that, the guarantee fund
aims to establish a lear-
ning process, so that in
the long run guarantee holders can win the trust
of the credit institution without this external
guarantee.
A leverage effect
Every guarantee fund should aim to work cost
effectively. Creating a financial lever is an essen-
tial step along the way. After several years of acti-
vity, a guarantee fund should be in a position to
guarantee a volume of credit that exceeds its
own several times over. Failing to create this
lever can lead to doubts over the repayments to
be expected. If the banks do not share in the risk,
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this may even call the fund’s purpose into
question. The lever determines the spread of
the risk as well as the cost price.
Credibility
The guarantee fund must have sufficient finan-
cial assets to meet its obligations without pro-
blem. Claims on a guarantee should not be held
up by excessive red tape. Moreover, the fund
should select its guarantee holders in a transpa-
rent and objective manner.
Transaction costs
What stops banks from lending money to smal-
ler companies on a larger scale is the high cost
of transactions, which has a direct effect on pro-
fitability. Saving on the cost of lending is there-
fore a critical aspect. To a large extent, the cur-
rent preference for the intermediary model rests
on this element.
Curtailment of the risk of abuse
The guarantee fund must employ means of cur-
tailing the risk of abuse. One important element
is the duration of the guarantee, particularly
when a letter of credit is used, (after all, the gua-
rantor cannot give notice on a letter of credit
unilaterally at any moment). Guarantees are tem-
porary in nature.
The following conditions also contribute to the
success of a guarantee fund:
• A credit market in which the banks do not meet
the demand from microenterprises
• The guarantee holders must be prepared to
pay, and be capable of paying, the normal com-
mercial rate of interest
5
to the credit institution
• A legal framework for guarantee funds (inclu-
ding the regulating authorities’ risk assess-
ments of guarantees offered to banks)
• The fiscal framework
• The amount of liquidity in the financial system
• The reinsurance possibilities for the guarantee
fund
27
5 plus the cost of the guarantee if it is passed on
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• The profitability of credit granting in general,
with regard to smaller businesses in particular
• The supply via other mechanisms, such as lea-
sing
• The guarantee fund’s own investment policy,
including its view of diversification
CHALLENGES
FOR THE FUTURE
The use of a guarantee must be advantageous to
all parties involved, and so it should not affect
the responsibilities of those parties.This element
is a key piece if it is sustainability that we are see-
king. The challenge is to find the distribution
keys for costs and benefits.
The intermediary model appears more fruitful
than the other two because it seems to provide
more additionality. It also addresses the problem
of transaction costs in a more active way.To what
extent can this yield a financial advantage for the
borrower? Several questions remain unan-
swered when it comes to distributing the costs
and risks. It seems hard at times to find a way
around the lender and guarantor doing double
the work. How do we reduce this to a minimum?
The leverage effect and the use
of a guarantee to help cover
insufficient collateral are factors
with a direct influence on the
total cost relations. Spreading
the costs and risks opportunely
between the parties is without
doubt one of the most impor-
tant challenges before us. How
much force can the lever take?
This need for an external gua-
rantee is the result of an imper-
fect market. The guarantee fund bridges the
information deficit.There is a current trend in the
microfinance sector to standardise the financial
information to be reported (from donors, central
bank, etc.). This standardisation is gaining
momentum, fuelled by the need for external
financing. Although it lessens the cost of opera-
tion of a guarantee fund, it may render the
mechanism useless in the future.
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The Belgian Raiffeisen Foundation (BRS) sup-
ports savings and credit organisations based on
cooperative principles. On 11 December 2001,
BRS organised a seminar in Brussels on the use
of guarantee funds in the context of microfinan-
ce. Guarantee funds are also in the ascension in
fair trade (see the box on the Belgian govern-
ment initiative). In preparing for the event it was
decided to confine the debate to the model of
intermediary guarantees. The BRS is concerned
with the problem of the MFIs in the South, and
their process of institutional development. One
of the main obstacles here is the attraction of
resources to develop the credit portfolios lent
out to microentrepreneurs.
As shown in the previous chapter, guarantee
funds can offer a solution to these financing
needs. The intermediary model rests on the rela-
tions that the MFI develops with the formal ban-
king sector. Through this, credit funds can flow
from the banking sector to the MFIs, for the pur-
pose of granting credit to microenterprises and
farmers.
A number of organisations
6
with experience in
this matter were approached to take part in the
discussion, namely:
• ADA, Appui au Développement Autonome, an
NGO from Luxembourg, which offers training
and financing for MFIs;
• ILO, the International Labour Organisation,
which has conducted extensive research into
the success factors involved in the guarantee
mechanism;
• Rabobank Foundation, which provides subsi-
dies and soft financing for cooperatives in the
South;
• SOS Faim, an NGO from Luxembourg and
Belgium, which set up a guarantee fund for
rural organisations in South America in 1992;
• IGF, International Guarantee Fund, a cooperati-
ve company which specialises in the provision
of guarantees;
• Maquita Cushunchic, an MFI from Ecuador with
a cooperative structure.
6 Contact details for these organisation can be found at the end of this publication.
The seminar attracted 90 interested parties from
all perspectives: the federal and regional govern-
ments, multilateral organisations, NGOs from the
three Benelux countries, academics, MFIs from
the South, European guarantee and credit funds
for developing countries, and financial institu-
tions and their associations from Belgium and
the Netherlands.
Confining the discussion to the intermediary
model of the guarantee fund, and the triangular
relationship that this implies between the gua-
rantor, guarantee holder, and local credit institu-
tion (bank), gave rise to the first question in the
debate. Is the creation of a relationship between
an MFI and local bank really a necessary step in
the institutional development of an MFI? The
Rabobank Foundation is of the opinion that
developing an MFI into a credit institution is only
a secondary objective, and prefers to turn its
attention to the aspect of organised trust. It
would be better if the financing in local micro-
finance initiatives were achieved by mobilising
the savings of the customers (or members).
Developing relations with the local banking sec-
tor could be a step in the starting phase, but in
the long term the MFI’s relation-
ship with the savers is more
important. From this perspective
the Rabobank Foundation conclu-
des that in the starting phase
external resources could just as
well be channelled directly to the
MFIs, and that a relationship with
the local bank would bring with it
little extra value.
However, the seminar focused on
aspects of the intermediary
model, which brings an intermediary organisa-
tion in touch with the formal banking sector.The
box on the IGF gives a brief description of how
this intermediary model can be applied in prac-
tice. The debate tended to centre on the stumb-
ling blocks in the system, such as management
of the costs and risks. The debate touched on 4
discussion points, which we will recount later.
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Belgian government takes initiative
to set up a Fair Trade Guarantee Fund
At the BRS seminar Eddy Boutmans, State
Secretary for Development Cooperation,
announced that the Belgian government is
intending to set up a Fair Trade Guarantee Fund.
Alongside microfinance, fair trade is another
area in which guarantee funds stand to make
an interesting contribution.
Economic growth in developing countries must
take place with the active participation of the
poor, so that they can contribute directly to the
growth and take their share of the benefits. This
means that economic growth should go hand in
hand with the creation of sustainable employ-
ment, with health and education facilities, with
the promotion of social organisations, with
acceptable wages and concern for vulnerable
groups. A well-functioning government is
important in a growth model of this kind. And it
is equally necessary that the private sector be
given ample space to develop. Therefore an
equal balance between the public and private
sectors would be ideal.
With the creation of the Fair Trade Guarantee
Fund, the Belgian government is taking an inno-
vative and development-relevant initiative in
the context of public/private development
cooperation. The BTC (Belgian Technical
Cooperation) will be given the task of managing
the Guarantee Fund.
A few of the concepts behind the creation of this
Guarantee Fund:
1. The European consumer wants fair trade
products;
2. The gulf between rich and poor continues to
grow;
3. A major part of the working population in
developing countries still does not have
access to fair credit;
4. The EU-ACP Cotonou agreement has
elements recognising that fair trade
measures are necessary, and encouraging
this type of initiative;
5. Besides conventional trade the European
Commission recognises the existence and
sense of the Fair Trade Initiative (FTI);
6. In its Federal Plan for Sustainable
Development the Belgian government states
that it will encourage an approval labelling
system that promotes fairer trade.
It is the opinion of the State Secretary that with
this initiative, Belgium is playing a leading role
in considering the active contribution that can
be made by the weaker manufacturing groups
in a global economy.
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A few figures (in euros) 
Distribution per region Guarantee % Leverage Credit
(year 2000) (sum) facility (amount) 
West Africa 116.848 10% 1,1 128.532
East Africa 271.754 24% 1,6 438.045
Central America 45.404 4% 2,0 90.807
South America 691.797 62% 4,3 2.991.562
Total 1.125.802 100% 3,2 3.648.947
Distribution per sector Guarantee %
(sum)
Trade 485.084 43%




International Guarantee Funds (IGF)
organisations that join and acquire shares in
the IGF (at least 10% of the guarantee sum).The
distribution is based on decentralised opera-
tion from three offices, i.e. Geneva, Cotonou and
Guatemala, plus about ten local representa-
tives in as many countries.
The IGF is an international non-profit-making
cooperative society, which was formed in
Geneva in 1996.The IGF furthers the activities of
the Swiss RAFAD foundation, which started
working with guarantee funds in the mid-
1980s. It is made up of organisations from the
North and South whose collective objective is to
fight poverty, organisations
such as savings banks, coffee
cooperatives and a small
number of Swiss NGOs.
By guaranteeing loans, the
IGF aims to create a relation-
ship with local financial
structures which enables it to
operate in the local currency.
As a cooperative structure it
only gives guarantees for
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The situation of the
guarantee holder: the Maquita
Cushunchic cooperative of
Ecuador as a typical example of
an MFI
The institutional development of the Maquita
Cushunchic cooperative in Quito, the capital of
Ecuador, illustrates the process during which the
incorporation of a guarantee fund becomes
appropriate. At the seminar, the president of the
cooperative, Mrs Patricia Camacho, described the
development as follows:
Why was this organisation set up?
• To give the population in the south of Quito
access to financial services, particularly female
entrepreneurs operating small businesses;
• To offer an alternative to the banking sector,
which finds the costs and risks of granting cre-
dit to microenterprises too high;
• To reach people with a low income, and of
whom the banks show little understanding, as a
result of which they do not turn to a bank.
State of affairs
Amounts in euro 1998 1999 2000 Oct. 2001
Number of members 1,509 3,214 6,185 7,955
Number of female members 925 1,925 3,714 4,535
Number of male members 584 1,289 2,471 3,420
Assets 113,175 161,358 575,647 947,826
Liabilities 87,208 127,291 479,868 818,872
Equity 25,966 34,067 90,344 123,483
Total savings 65,480 113,520 386,234 573,545
Average savings per member 32 27 49 54
Outstanding credit 91,986 155,138 370,578 721,340
Arrears (PAR 307) - 0,73% 0,48% 0,39%
Number of loans granted per period 402 798 804 1,401
Savings / credit ratio 71% 73% 104% 80%
The figures in the table clearly show the gradual growth of the cooperative. We also see that almost
across the board, the members’ savings remained behind the demand for loans. From the outset
Maquita had to call on external sources to bring its credit granting up to level.
7 The method of calculation is “Portfolio at risk”after thirty days. A percentage is calculated by dividing the total outstanding
amount of the credits, in default for thirty days or more, by the total amount outstanding in the credit portfolio. The figure
shows how much of the outstanding credit can be lost if the current trend in default continues.
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According to Maquita, there is still an enormous
unsatisfied demand for credit in the southern
districts of Quito. Only a small number of institu-
tions are prepared to react to this demand, but
they do not have the resources to satisfy it.
As we can see from the defaults, the quality of
the lending is extremely good. Nonetheless,
Maquita can barely appeal to the local financial
sector because it can offer no traditional gua-
rantees and has difficulty demonstrating its cre-
ditworthiness. This touches a sore spot, because
the lack of trust from the formal financial sector
puts the cooperative’s chances of obtaining
affordable finance at risk. During the contacts to
solve this problem they looked at the possibili-
ties offered by a guarantee fund. The stumbling
blocks they came across were put before the
panel as points for discussion.
DISCUSSION POINT 1:
What can a guarantee fund
do to strengthen the trust
of the formal financial sector?
A guarantee is provided to strengthen the nego-
tiating position of the organisation requesting
credit from the bank. The financial instrument
used to grant the guarantee, the letter of credit, is
a well-known instrument in the world of ban-
king. Thus the guarantee fund aims to raise the
creditworthiness of the guarantee holder in the
eyes of the bank.
The IGF deposits its funds and obtains its letters
of credit from one of the larger Swiss banks. The
reputation of this bank lends extra credibility to
the guarantee mechanism. This provides levera-
ge with the local bank so that, on the basis of the
guarantee, it provides a loan far in excess of the
guarantee sum. The experience of IGF/RAFAD is
that on the medium term an average leverage of
three can be achieved, or, in other words, the
partner receives three times as much credit as
the IGF gives by way of guarantee. This means
that for every euro that the IGF has in its guaran-
tee fund, the microenterprises can invest three in
their businesses. However, it usually takes a few
years before the local bank decides to carry part
of the risk. Therefore, the leverage effect seldom
plays a role from the very beginning.To encoura-
ge the banks to share the risk the IGF asks the
guarantee holder to contribute a guarantee of its
own, such as a mortgage on its buildings.
37
In 1992 SOS Faim set up a guarantee fund for
associations of producers (such as coffee farmer
cooperatives) and MFIs that offer their services
to organised groups of this type. Between 1995
and 2000, guarantees totalling 6.2 million euros
were issued. SOS Faim managed to achieve an
average leverage of 1.65 on its guarantees in this
period. This resulted in a total credit volume of
10.27 million euros for the intermediaries. They
were able to provide almost 15,000 microcredits
to their members.
The guarantee fund is responsible for correctly
selecting these intermediary MFIs. In SOS Faim,
this translates to a high-risk profile among the
guarantee holders, because they mainly issue
guarantees to partner organisations in their
NGO operations. However, this deliberate choice
leads the banks to restrict their acceptance of
risks, which in turn weakens the leverage effect.
However, as SOS Faim points out, a higher
leverage does not necessarily mean that the
local bank will actually decide to accept the risk.
It is often the case that a higher credit volume
can only be obtained if the borrowing interme-
diary provides extra guarantees, such as a mort-
gage. Though an external guarantee may be
available, it can prove difficult to achieve any real
leverage. The example of La Florida says it all.
Therefore, in marginal cases, leverage is not
merely an important aspect, but rather a way to
access finance that otherwise would simply not
be available.
ADA turned the seminar’s attention to the ran-
king order in the distribution of the risk. ADA
issues guarantees with a minimum leverage of
two. Since this leverage remains in place for the
entire life of the loan, the guarantee sum reduces
in proportion to the amount of credit repaid.The
guarantee is reviewed annually, based on the
amount outstanding on the loan.
The La Florida Producers’
Cooperative of Peru
In 2000 this cooperative attracted a loan to
finance exports of coffee. It borrowed 672,332
euros from a local bank. For this loan SOS
Faim and IGF/RAFAD provided La Florida with
guarantees amounting to 295,826 euros. But
in addition to these guarantees, the coopera-
tive mortgaged its buildings. That mortgage
had a value of 419,535 euros.
Counting everything together this gives a
leverage of less than one. But this simple cal-
culation is not enough to express the real
leverage. The cooperative’s managers were of
the opinion that the bank only considered the
loan because of the external (foreign) guaran-
tors. The mortgage would have been of little
value if the guarantee fund had not made a
contribution.
To the producers of La Florida, the added
value of the guarantee fund was greater than
the difference between the guarantee sum
and credit sum, but it was a matter of having
or not having a credit facility to help them
commercialise their most important crop.
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Therefore the borrowing bank covers at least
50% of the risk (to obtain the leverage of two).
The general practice is that ADA covers 90% of
the remainder and leaves 10% of the risk to the
MFI. The MFI’s share is covered by a term depo-
sit endorsed to the lender.This guarantee carries
the first risk. ADA’s guarantee carries the second
risk.
The ILO pointed out that leverage also plays a
role in the European context. The Netherlands
has operated the Kredietregeling voor Midden- en
Kleinbedrijf
8
(Small to Medium Enterprise Credit
Regulation) since 1915. All the large banks have
signed up to this system, which provides more
than half a billion euros in guarantees for about
3750 Dutch SMEs every year. The banks act as a
distribution channel and are even free to decide
themselves whether or not a state guarantee
should be linked to a given loan application.This
mechanism comes with a fixed commission of
3% as well as a leverage of two (the bank must
give credit equivalent to twice the guarantee
sum).
For ADA, the leverage of the guarantee is essen-
tial - not because it removes the risk, but becau-
se it distributes it. This is the first step in the pro-
cess of learning how to manage risk, and can be
extended to the management of liabilities under
the criteria of stability and sustainability. In this
perspective guarantees are a transitional instru-
ment and therefore temporary in nature.
If we want to improve the relationship between
the MFI and the local bank, the instrument must
have a favourable effect on the local bank’s cost
of lending. The intermediary model is proven to
limit the local banks’ costs. There is no need to
invest in staff or product development to service
the microenterprise sector.The guarantee brings
the risk and therefore the cost further down.
Nonetheless, this cost-lowering element does
not always counterbalance the risk aspect. In the
African context in particular, the local banking
sector is often very cautious of risks. Especially
when it has only just come into being itself, as is
often the case.
The crucial factor here is that the local bank per-
ceives a reduction in the risk (e.g. guarantee via
letter of credit from a reputable financial institu-
8 In Belgium we have the Agricultural Investment Fund and Econex.
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tion), and that the contractual provisions are
very clear, with little room for interpretation or
dispute. Furthermore, the reduced risk should
not be negated by time-consuming procedures.
Here, ADA refers to the “triggering”, or the condi-
tions that can lead to a payment of the guaran-
tee. Prompt payment when a loan is (rightly) cal-
led in favours the system’s credibility.
Obviously, pinning a relationship between the
MFIs and the financial sector is no easy task, but
this does not make it any less important. It is a
learning process in which ample time should be
taken, and in which we cannot expect high levels
of confidence too soon. The distribution of the
risks is the best indicator of progress.
DISCUSSION POINT 2:
What does it cost an MFI
to use a guarantee fund
and how can this be reduced?
Interest rates, even in hard currency (dollars), are
relatively high in the countries of the South. In
South America an interest rate of 18 to 20% in
hard currency is about average. Although the
guarantee is designed to increase the credibility
of the guarantee holder in the eyes of the local
banking sector, only in exceptional cases does it
pave the way to better terms of credit.
The administrative and other management costs
associated with the guarantee fund, and the los-
ses too, make it necessary to charge the guaran-
tee holder an extra fee for the service. Thus the
IGF charges 4 to 5% per annum for a guarantee,
and ADA charges 3.5% per annum. This may
appear to be a very hefty additional cost, but it is
an element that can be reduced through higher
leverage (additional cost of guarantee = com-
mission divided by leverage). The IGF raised the
example of NYESIGISO in Mali (see frame), where
a leverage of 3.3 was achieved. The additional
cost for the guarantee on this loan is then 5%/3.3
= 1.5%.
ADA uses fixed guarantee commissions, which it
does not differentiate in terms of the risk associ-
ated with the individual guarantee. ADA believes
that this is the only way it can keep its guaran-
tees affordable.
SOS Faim refers to the limited possibilities of
achieving leverage in a certain context.The typo-
logy of the guarantee holder (rural character,
unregulated etc.) constitutes a further restric-
tion. SOS Faim offers its guarantee fund services
free of charge to its guarantee holders. This clear
positioning has enabled SOS Faim’s guarantee
fund to find a more or less unique niche, taking it
away from direct competition with other funds.
ADA too recognises that extra expenses on top
of the financial costs of the loan are a disadvan-
tage for the guarantee. The majority of its gua-
rantees go through special credit channels in the
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real development of relations between the len-
der and the guarantee holder. This is why there
has been a major shift in the use of the guaran-
tee fund by SOS Faim. In 2000, organisations
such as Alterfin, Oikocredit and Etimos received
31% of SOS Faim’s guarantees, whereas this
figure was only 11% in 1997.
In this regard, the IGF distinguished another
bright spot in the shape of the cooperative
federations in the South, which can also be an
alternative to the commercial banking sector.
In certain cases, organisations like the Rabobank
Foundation have gone a step further by offering
direct credit at considerably lower rates of inte-
rest than those quoted above, in which the
financial cost is subsidised directly (= soft finan-
cing).
On this point SOS Faim voiced the doubt that
cost reductions are not passed on to the end
North, and not local banks in the developing
countries. By using alternative channels of credit
it is possible to obtain better interest conditions,
at rates of between 6 and 9%.
Different organisations in the North offer long
term loans at better rates than can be obtained
from commercial banks in the South. Not only
are these alternative channels cheaper, but they
are also prepared to analyse the application tho-
roughly and monitor it seriously. Here there is a
were reached through group loans. A
woman rose to the top of the organisation.
The broadening of activities had a very posi-
tive effect on the financial results. In 1999
Nyesigiso managed to repay the credit, as a
result of which the guarantee was released.
This happened eight months before the due
date agreed with RAFAD. There was no need
for further guarantees after this because
Nyesigiso, thanks to its growth, had become
an interesting partner for the Banque
Internationale de Mali.
NYESIGISO in Mali
In Mali, one of the poorest countries in the
world, the informal sector accounts for 80%
of the economy. Despite high levels of liquid-
ity in the financial sector, the latter is not
really prepared to grant credit to informal
enterprises.
Nyesigiso, a local savings and credit organi-
sation was created in 1987. In 1997, after
steady growth, the organisation was con-
fronted with such an increase in the demand
for credit that it found it impossible to meet.
A guarantee of around 88,000 euros was
obtained from RAFAD, with which a credit
facility of 3.3 times this amount was guaran-
teed at the local bank, the Banque
Internationale de Mali.
With this, in 1997, Nyesigiso was able to offer
credit to 5,828 microentrepreneurs, which
gave an immediate boost to local employ-
ment. On top of this a number of other sav-
ings groups joined. More and more women
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users of the microcredit. Though they do benefit
from broader and quicker levels of service, direct
cost reductions are not so immediately felt.
Guarantees inevitably involve costs. These may
or may not be passed on to the guarantee hol-
ders. Nonetheless, we can say that the extra cost
to an MFI for using a guarantee is determined
first of all by the leverage vis-à-vis the sum bor-
rowed. Negotiation of the leverage is crucial and
it is recommended that plenty of time be spent
on this.The objective should be to obtain a lever-
age of at least two. However, it is important for
the MFI to maintain profitability at the end of the
day.
DISCUSSION POINT 3:
CAN A GUARANTEE FUND BE
FINANCIALLY SUSTAINABLE?
Every guarantee must be adapted to its context.
And so we should look at each guarantee on a
case-by-case basis, which implies costs. On the
other hand, we can say that the instrument is
flexible enough to satisfy a variety of contexts.
ADA has found that the guarantee fund is a con-
tributing factor in meeting its social objectives
as an NGO, but that it does not appear sustaina-
ble in economic terms. ADA views microfinance
as a means of fighting poverty, which should be
able to cover its costs, and this is relevant to the
guarantee fund too. At the present time the sec-
tor is still at a very early point of the learning
curve, not able yet to cover its costs in full.
Nonetheless, ADA now believes that the pro-
gress made along the learning curve matches
the financial results for its guarantee fund.
The ILO turned the seminar’s attention to the
rich European experience of guarantee funds.
There are two dominant models in the European
context: mutual guarantee associations (MGAs,
common in Italy, Spain and France) and public
guarantee systems (extensive in the United
Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands).
MGAs have their origins in the tradition of the
guilds and professional associations. Though
MGAs have been brought to life in many diffe-
rent ways, what they all have in common is that
they give their affiliated members access to cre-
dit facilities. The first building blocks of any MGA
come from membership contributions.
Depending on the country, we note that com-
mercial partners or authorities often play a role
in the further accrual of funds. In most countries
we see a considerable subsidy component in the
form of reinsurance guarantees extended to
MGAs via regional and national authorities.
We tend to find public guarantee systems in
countries where the tradition of guilds and pro-
fessional associations is less pronounced. Here
too the ILO points out that this guarantee
mechanism is seldom subsidy free. While critics
argue that financial intervention in developing
countries should be free of subsidies, the mecha-
nisms that extend credit to microenterprises via
guarantees here in Europe are all supported
financially in one way or another. Obviously, con-
siderations of a macro-economic nature and
social aspects play a decisive role.
The guarantee fund of SOS Faim is dependent
on permanent subsidising. Indeed, it does not
pass on costs to the guarantee holders because
it relies on state support. SOS Faim does not aim
for a specialised guarantee fund that develops
this service as an independent activity. The gua-
rantees are an extra service provided for partner
organisations that cooperate with SOS Faim.
They are provided on the understanding that
they will become superfluous once the organisa-
tion has accrued its own equity. SOS Faim does
however point out that this objective often
appears unattainable.
However, the IGF does aim to be a specialised
guarantee fund, not basing its selection on a gra-
duation of the guarantee holder. On the contra-
ry, the guarantee holder becomes an IGF share-
holder. During the discussion it was noted that
this 10% basis results in a rise in costs for the
guarantee holder. The IGF’s screening is based
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solely on criteria of efficiency in performing cur-
rent activities. Since its formation in 1996 it has
never sustained a loss. Over the entire period
from 1985 to 2000, the experience of RAFAD
included, the average annual loss of guarantees
amounted to 4.5% of the fund. The interest ear-
ned by investing the fund was used to supple-
ment the guarantees paid out, the administrati-
ve costs, and local monitoring. With a volume of
around four million euros, the IGF will be able to
cover its costs. At the present time the IGF is still
partially dependent on subsidies. It has also
managed to reinsure a substantial part of its
fund through the Swiss government.
The sheer wealth of finance options creates
uncertainty as to who can go where and for
what. The Rabobank Foundation notes that
donor organisations sometimes work against
each other and do not exchange enough infor-
mation. This makes it more difficult to join the
commercial circuit. The Rabobank Foundation
also recognises a clear problem on the side of
the MFIs. There are not enough promising insti-
tutions to hand. And so the Rabobank
Foundation sees a considerable challenge in
developing institutional capacity, and particular-
ly in making the move from a credit organisation
to a structure of confidence.
This is a point that the others endorse, and it rela-
tes to the initial screening and further monito-
ring of the MFIs. They all emphasise a proper
screening of the management capacity of the
guarantee holder (i.e. the loan portfolio and
financial situation in general) as a success factor.
This management capacity is largely determined
by the degree of institutional development.
Organisations with a weak institutional develop-
ment require extra support to develop internal
capacity. The IGF is of the opinion that finding
valid guarantee holders is no easy task.
Of equal importance is the further monitoring of
the guarantee holder, and this is the spur for fur-
ther institutional development. Monitoring fills
the information void between guarantor and
guarantee holder. It demands discipline and the-
refore better quality in the granting of credit. Not
only that, but it stimulates the guarantee hol-
ding MFI to operate in conformance with the
market. In this way it contributes towards a struc-
tural solution to the problem of access to credit
for microentrepreneurs.
The consequences on the sustainability of the
guarantee fund run deep. The set-up (assess-
ment of creditworthiness and management
capacity) and monitoring of a guarantee is an
intensive labour and requires a sound knowled-
ge of the sector. Transparency and standardised
information (rating & performance measurement)
are (still) thinly spread, making it extremely diffi-
cult to assess the debt capacity of an MFI. It will
only be possible to restructure the costs on the
basis of the risks run by each party (differentia-
ted commissions and levers) once we can deter-
mine the quality of financial management in line
with a given standard.
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It was generally concluded that there is a need to
address the lack of information on the manage-
rial aspects of MFIs. Standard information is an
essential tool for proper screening and monito-
ring. It ties in with the present trend for greater
transparency in the microfinance industry.
At the present time, intermediary guarantee
funds in microfinance are mostly not viable.
Microfinance aims to provide a structural solu-
tion, and so the covering of costs is also relevant
to guarantee funds. But experience in Europe
shows that this mechanism is not entirely cost
covering and so requires a certain level of subsi-
disy. Financial charges and benefits must be
systematically mapped out so that a clear pictu-
re of this subsidy element can be gained, and
where possible restricted or phased out.
DISCUSSION POINT 4:
What is the further role
of the North?
The IGF emphasised that a guarantee fund can
be built up with no exposure to the exchange
rate risk. Guarantee funds are not based on a
transfer of resources. The guarantee fund of the
IGF remains in Switzerland, where it is invested in
an ethical way. This investment portfolio repre-
sents the underlying value for guarantees in
American dollars or Swiss francs. A bank in the
South then provides the local organisation with
a credit facility expressed in the local currency. In
the event of devaluation, the value of the gua-
rantee will not be adversely affected. Indeed, the
opposite holds true. In such cases the value of
the guarantee rises against the credit, which is
expressed in a weaker currency. Nor is the gua-
rantee holder exposed to the exchange rate risk.
Moreover, in some countries, such as Ecuador
and Rwanda, there are strict regulations gover-
ning exports of currency, which can impede the
repayment of a direct loan. The guarantee
mechanism is suited to measures of this type
and can initiate the granting of credit, even in
countries where changing one currency to ano-
ther is not a simple matter. However, it is not uni-
versal. Some countries have insufficient macro-
economic stability or an uncooperative banking
sector. And the fund can only be used to guaran-
tee economic activities.
The ILO points out that the European models do
not appear to be transferable to the develop-
ment countries. For example the MGAs are asso-
ciated with a tradition of guilds and professional
associations, and are started internally on the
strength of member contributions. Public gua-
rantee systems are extremely sensitive to politi-
cal pressure and susceptible to bureaucracy and
corruption.The Dutch system, which rests on the
excellent self-discipline of the banks, does not
appear applicable in most development country
contexts. A public guarantee system in a develo-
ping country would be exposed to a financial
sector with countless imbalances, and thus a
heightened danger of abuse.
From the floor there came the comment that
guarantee funds appear only to seek leverage
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over the local bank in the South. In the case of a
bank in the North we assume by definition that
this is not possible. On what basis therefore can
we expect this from a bank in the South? The gist
of the replies was that a bank in the North can
only do this if it looks into the risk, which is
impossible in this framework. This is certainly
true for an individual case of guarantee granting.
On the other hand, however, a fund can be said
to form a “pool” of guarantees. Might this be a
starting point for looking into mechanisms that
increase the range of products from the North?
ADA is of the opinion that it will always be
important to analyse whether the guarantee is
the right instrument for the application. Other
options should be kept open. After all, a guaran-
tee fund leaves a major problem with MFIs
unsolved, agrees SOS Faim. An organisation’s len-
ding capacity is largely determined by the level
of its capital adequacy. A bank uses this ratio of
solvency to determine whether it can allow extra
credit. Guarantee funds cannot provide solutions
for jacking up this ratio.
What came across in this discussion was the sig-
nal of caution from just about every organisa-
tion. The needs of MFIs go beyond the purely
financial. Support organisations must have the
capacity to identify problem areas and work out
solutions. Building a guarantee fund into a range
of other support services is therefore a sensible
option.
4G U A R A N T E E  F U N D S :
c h o i c e  o f  t h e  B e l g i a n
R a f f e i s e n  F o u n d a t i o n  
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Further to this seminar the BRS decided to set up
its own guarantee fund in 2002 - to which MFIs
(present partners + MFIs with which BRS has not
yet cooperated) would have access - in further
support of the microfinance sector.The BRS aims
to give a substantial impulse by depositing a
sum of 250,000 euros for this guarantee fund.
The BRS views the guarantee fund as an additio-
nal instrument to support the microfinance sec-
tor. It ties in perfectly with the
range of services currently offered
by the BRS: finance, training and
consultancy. The guarantee fund
is part of the finance element, but
adds to these services a tool to
meet the needs of its partners.
This is part of a strategy designed
to support the institutional deve-
lopment of MFIs until they are
able to continue independently.
This guarantee fund will be run
under the principles of the intermediary guaran-
tee model. Moreover, the BRS is of the opinion
that a link between MFIs and the commercial
financial circuit is important as a part of the
overall process of institutionalising MFIs. From
this perspective it has been decided to use the
BRS guarantee fund solely to support MFIs in
developing countries, for the loans they enter
into with local financial institutions. From the
seminar discussions it is clear that employment
in this manner is not always the easiest way of
mobilising the guarantee fund. The guarantor
(BRS) finds a sound knowledge of the MFI and
the local financial institution to be important.
Therefore, in the operational management of its
guarantee fund the BRS will call upon other
existing guarantee funds with practical expe-
rience and knowledge of the field.
One major way of reducing the cost of the gua-
rantee fund for the MFI is through the credit
leverage that can be realised with the fund. In
practice these levers have turned out to be rela-
tively small, particularly in the first stage.
Nonetheless, the BRS will attempt to realise a
leverage of 2.5 through its guarantee fund, in
other words, the credit will be at least double the
size of the guarantee sum pledged via the fund.
Another way of lowering costs for the guarantee
holder is to use subsidies, which cannot be enti-
rely ruled out in practice in any case. From the
perspective of institutional development, this is
not inconsistent with the objective of develo-
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ping sustainable savings and credit systems.
Hence the decision of the BRS to provide a sub-
sidy component too: the BRS will provide gua-
rantee-holding MFIs with extra support to cover
the costs that the intermediary guarantee fund
charges the guarantee holder.This support (sub-
sidy) will extend to a maximum of 3% of the sum
issued by the BRS by way of a guarantee.
The BRS also takes seriously the issue that the
banking world in the North should play a more
active role. The BRS undertakes to look into
mechanisms that imply extra leverage for MFIs in
the South. More particularly, the BRS will investi-
gate how leverage can also be applied to the
guarantee fund in the North, and how the ratio
of the deposit of 250,000 euros to the letters of
credit can increase.
For more information on the guarantees provi-
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According to the annual report of the World
Bank, 2.8 billion people, or almost half of the
world population, lives on less than 2 dollars a
day. 1.2 billion people have even less than 1 dol-
lar a day! Much hope has been pinned on the
sector of microfinancing as a way of helping to
rectify this inequality. The Belgian Raiffeisen-
stichting [Raiffeisen Foundation] (BRS) supports
savings and lending organisations in the South,
which work on the basis of co-operative princi-
ples.
In general terms, the microfinancing sector
offers financial services under certain conditions
to people who do not have access to a commer-
cial bank because of their socio-economic pro-
file.These are poor people, with no fixed income,
who can offer nothing in the way of collateral.
When we refer to savings and lending organisa-
tions in this book we are talking about organisa-
tions in the microfinancing sector, which tailor
their services towards the poorer populations in
the South. To place the role of the guarantee
fund in context, the book starts out by identify-
ing the leading characteristics of the sector as a
whole.
It is now generally accepted that under certain
conditions microfinancing services can be devel-
oped with a view to financial sustainability. In
recent years the microfinancing sector has wit-
nessed an explosive growth and so it is looking
for extra sources of financing. Clearly, at the
financing level, the microfinancing institutions
(MFIs) have received greater recognition and
interest from the commercial banking sector.
However, there is still a huge gulf and a lingering
degree of mutual distrust. The challenge, there-
fore, is to encourage reciprocity in order to satis-
fy the demand for micro credit. In this context
guarantee funds may prove to be an appropriate
instrument.
Guarantee funds are hardly a new phenomenon.
In the second chapter we describe the mecha-
nism at work and give an overview of the various
models to hand. We also highlight some of the
strong and weak points of the guarantee fund,
and distil from this the main points to bear in
mind when designing a successful guarantee
fund. The clarity of the objectives, the credibility
of the fund, the leverage effect, the transaction
costs, and containment of the risk of abuse are
key elements in any guarantee fund. And yet it is
still a great challenge to actually put these ele-
ments to work in practice.
This is why on 11 December 2001, BRS organised
a seminar in Brussels on the use of guarantee
funds within the context of microfinancing. The
seminar attracted ninety interested parties from
a variety of perspectives: the federal and region-
al governments, multilateral organisations, NGOs
from the three Benelux countries, university staff,
MFIs from the South, European guarantee and
lending funds for development countries, and
financial institutions and their associations in
Belgium and the Netherlands.
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The debate was confined to the intermediate
model of the guarantee fund, characterised by
the relationship that an MFI builds up with the
formal banking sector. Though this, lending
funds can flow from the banking sector to the
MFIs to provide loans for micro-entrepreneurs
and farmers. BRS’s operations centre in on this
very issue, i.e. MFIs in the South, which are in the
process of institutional development.
The analysis starts out by looking at the situation
of the guarantee holder, and we have taken as
our example a typical MFI, the Maquita
Cushunchic cooperative society in Ecuador. This
co-operative society is virtually unable to make
use of the local financial sector because it can
offer no traditional guarantees, and can find no
simple way of demonstrating its credit worthi-
ness. This is clearly the sore spot, for the lack of
trust from the formal financial sector inhibits the
chances of obtaining affordable financing. The
panel and audience discussed the obstacles fac-
ing Maquita, and came up with the following
findings:
What can a guarantee fund do to 
strengthen the confidence of the formal
financial sector? 
It is crucial that the local bank perceives a les-
sening of the risk. Obviously, setting up rela-
tions between MFIs and the financial sector is
no simple matter. But that doesn’t make it any
less important. It is a learning process that
requires time, and in which we can have no
expectation that confidence will rise in the
short term. The spreading of the risk is the
best indicator of progress. The leverage affor-
ded by the guarantee is a point for considera-
tion here.
What does it cost an MFI to use a guaran-
tee fund and can this cost be reduced?
Even in hard currency, interest rates are relati-
vely high in Southern countries. The use of
guarantees inevitably brings more costs, and
so is not entirely advantageous. These costs
may or may not be charged on to the guaran-
tee holder. Nonetheless, the extra costs incur-
red on a guarantee by the MFI are largely de-
fined by the leverage of the sum borrowed. At
the end of the day profitability will determine
whether or not the MFI views the guarantee
as an option.
Can a guarantee fund be financially
sustainable?
Guarantee funds run into many restrictions
due to an insufficient potential of sustainable
MFIs. Therefore, the process of setting up
(estimating creditworthiness and manage-
ment capacity) and monitoring a guarantee is
labour intensive, and requires a sound know-
ledge of the sector. Only when the quality of
financial management is standardised in an
MFI can we undertake the step of restructu-
ring the costs, based on the risks run by each
party. This is why, at the present time, the
intermediate guarantee funds used for
microfinancing do not usually cover the costs.
But, from the perspective of institutional
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development, this is not inconsistent with the
objective of developing sustainable systems
of saving and lending.
What role can the North play in 
the future? 
The needs of the MFIs are more than purely
financial. Support organisations must be able
to identify problem areas and find solutions. It
is always important to make a clear analysis of
whether the guarantee is appropriate to the
specific need. Other options should be kept
open too. The inclusion of a guarantee fund
within a range of support services is there-
fore the obvious choice.
Further to this seminar BRS decided to provide
its own guarantee fund, in 2002, in support of the
microfinancing sector. BRS will deposit a sum of
EUR 250,000 for this fund. The initiative is part of
a range of services that BRS currently has its dis-
posal - financing, training and consultancy. The
guarantee fund falls under the heading of
financing, but adds to these services an instru-
ment capable of satisfying the new needs of its
partners. This is part of a strategy aimed at sup-
porting the institutional development of MFIs, to
the point where they can continue on an inde-
pendent basis.
The guarantee fund will be available to the pres-
ent partners of BRS, and to MFIs with which BRS
does not yet co-operate.
The basic conditions are:
• operational management via existing guaran-
tee funds
• provision of loans by financial institutions in
the country itself (South)
• minimum credit/guarantee ratio of 2.5
• maximum BRS participation of 3% in the MFI’s
costs
For more information on the guarantees pro-
vided by BRS, please contract the secretarial
service at the address:
Belgische Raiffeisenstichting
Guarantee fund






Según el informe anual del Banco Mundial, 2.800
millones de personas, o casi la mitad de la pobla-
ción mundial, viven con menos de 2 dólares al
día. 1.200 millones de personas viven incluso con
menos de 1 dólar al día. Se espera que el sector
de la microfinanciación pueda ayudar a remediar
esta desigualdad. La Fundación Belga de
Raiffeisen (BRS) apoya a las organizaciones de
ahorro y crédito del Sur que funcionan como
cooperativas.
En términos generales, el sector de la microfi-
nanciación proporciona bajo determinadas con-
diciones servicios financieros a personas que no
pueden acceder a los bancos comerciales por su
perfil socioeconómico. Se trata de personas
pobres, sin ingresos fijos, que no pueden ofrecer
garantías materiales. Cuando en este libro habla-
mos de organizaciones de ahorro y crédito, nos
referimos a las organizaciones del sector de las
microfinanzas dirigidas a la población pobre del
Sur. El libro empieza explicando las característi-
cas más importantes del sector en su conjunto
para poder enmarcar el papel de los fondos de
garantía.
Ya se sabe que la prestación de servicios de
microcréditos bajo determinadas condiciones
puede conducir a la sostenibilidad financiera. El
sector de la microfinanciación ha conocido una
rápida evolución en los últimos años y, por lo
tanto, está buscando más fuentes de financia-
ción. En el ámbito financiero, el sector de la
banca comercial ya ha mostrado más interés y
reconocimiento para las instituciones de microfi-
nanciación (IMF). Sin embargo, el abismo no ha
sido franqueado del todo y sigue existiendo una
desconfianza mutua. Por eso, fomentar la inte-
racción para poder satisfacer la demanda de los
microcréditos se ha convertido en un reto
importante. Los fondos de garantía pueden ser
un instrumento útil en este contexto.
Los fondos de garantía no son un fenómeno
nuevo. En el segundo capítulo describimos
cómo funcionan y damos una relación detallada
de los distintos modelos que existen. También
presentamos las virtudes y los defectos genera-
les del fondo de garantía para así llegar a los
puntos clave para el diseño óptimo de un fondo
de garantía. La claridad de los objetivos, la credi-
bilidad del fondo, el efecto palanca, los gastos de
transacción y la limitación del riesgo son ele-
mentos claves para un buen fondo de garantía.
Poner en práctica todos estos elementos sigue
siendo un gran reto.
El 11 de diciembre de 2001, la fundación BRS
organizó en Bruselas un seminario sobre los fon-
dos de garantía en el contexto de la microfinan-
ciación. El seminario atrajo a noventa participan-
tes de varios sectores: el gobierno federal y
regional, organizaciones multilaterales, ONG de
los tres países del Benelux, colaboradores de uni-
versidades, IMF del Sur, Fondos Europeos de
Garantía y Crédito para los países en desarrollo,
instituciones financieras y sus asociaciones de
Bélgica y los Países Bajos.
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El debate se redujo al modelo intermedio de los
fondos de garantía, caracterizado por la relación
que existe entre la IMF y el sector bancario for-
mal. Así los fondos de crédito del sector bancario
pueden fluir hacia las IMF, para conceder créditos
a microempresas y agricultores. El trabajo de la
fundación BRS se centra en especial en la pro-
blemática de las IMF del Sur, que se encuentran
en pleno desarrollo institucional.
El punto de partida en este análisis es la situa-
ción de la que toma la garantía y como ejemplo
práctico hablamos de una IMF típica, como la
cooperativa Maquita Cushunchic del Ecuador.
Esta cooperativa no puede acudir al sector finan-
ciero local porque no puede ofrecer garantías
tradicionales y le resulta difícil demostrar su sol-
vencia. Esta afirmación pone el dedo en la llaga
ya que la falta de confianza del sector financiero
formal dificulta la obtención de una financiación
asequible. Los problemas de Maquita fueron pre-
sentados al público y a los expertos como temas
de debate. Las conclusiones se pueden resumir
como sigue:
¿Cómo puede un fondo de garantía con-
tribuir a fomentar la confianza del sector
financiero formal? 
Es crucial que el banco local perciba una
reducción del riesgo. La existencia de relacio-
nes entre las IMF y el sector financiero no se
puede dar por hecha, aunque por ello no sea
menos importante. Es un proceso de apren-
dizaje que requiere tiempo y no se puede
esperar que la confianza pueda aumentar a
corto plazo. La distribución del riesgo es el
mejor indicador para medir el progreso, sien-
do la palanca de la garantía el punto de
atención.
¿Cuáles son los gastos de una IMF como
usuario de un fondo de garantía? y ¿Cómo
pueden ser reducidos estos gastos? 
Los tipos de interés, incluso en una moneda
fuerte, son relativamente altos en los países
del Sur. Tomar garantías conlleva más gastos
por lo que no se puede considerar como una
operación totalmente ventajosa. También se
podrían cobrar estos gastos al tomador. Sin
embargo, el gasto extra originado cuando la
IMF toma una garantía es determinado por
la palanca con respecto a la oferta crediticia.
Finalmente, la rentabilidad para la IMF
determinará si la garantía es una opción.
¿Puede ser un fondo de garantía económi-
camente sostenible? 
Los fondos de garantía están sometidos a
muchas limitaciones porque faltan IMF
potencialmente sostenibles. Tanto el estable-
cimiento (evaluación de la solvencia y capa-
cidad de gestión) como el seguimiento de la
garantía son intensivos y requieren un con-
ocimiento profundo del sector. Cuando
como norma se puede comprobar la calidad
de la gestión financiera en una IMF se puede
dar el paso hacia la reestructuración de los
gastos basándose en los riesgos que cada
parte corre. Por eso los fondos de garantía
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intermedios para la microfinanciación no son
todavía al cien por cien rentables. Pero den-
tro de la óptica de la construcción institucio-
nal no entra en contradicción con el objetivo
de desarrollar unos sistemas de ahorro y cré-
dito sostenibles.
¿Cuál es en adelante el papel del Norte?
Las IMF no tienen solamente necesidades
financieras. Las organizaciones de apoyo
deben tener la capacidad de identificar las
áreas problemáticas y desarrollar soluciones.
Sigue siendo importante analizar la idonei-
dad de la garantía para una necesidad espe-
cífica. La puerta no debe cerrarse a otras
opciones. La introducción de un fondo de
garantía en un abanico de servicios de
apoyo es por lo tanto una opción sensata.
Como seguimiento al seminario, la fundación
BRS decidió poner a disposición un fondo de
garantía propio para apoyar al sector de las
microfinanzas a partir del año 2002. La funda-
ción depositará 250.000  para este fondo de
garantía. La iniciativa se enmarca en los servicios
que BRS ya ofrece: financiación, formación y con-
sulta. El fondo de garantía entra en la división de
financiación pero amplía estos servicios con un
instrumento que puede satisfacer las nuevas
necesidades de sus socios. Además forma parte
de una estrategia que pretende fomentar el
desarrollo institucional de las IMF hasta que pue-
dan funcionar de manera independiente.
Al fondo de garantía podrán acceder tanto los
socios actuales de BRS, como las IMF que no han
formalizado ningún tipo de cooperación con
BRS.
Las condiciones de acceso son:
• gestión operacional a través de fondos de
garantía existentes
• concesión de créditos por instituciones
financieras del país mismo (del Sur)
• ratio mínimo crédito/garantía de 2,5
• participación máxima de BRS del 3% en el
gasto para la IMF
Para mayor información sobre las garantías que
BRS ofrece, no dude en contactar con nuestra
secretaría en la dirección:
Belgische Raiffeisenstichting
Garantiefonds




WHO: The ILO’s Social Finance Programme has
three major objectives: (i) integrating financial and
social policies, (ii) creating employment and (iii)
reducing the vulnerability of the poor. Gender is a
cross-cutting issue in the three key areas of
intervention. The Programme designs and imple-
ments projects to steer financial institutions to
employment and poverty reduction.
WHY: Financial market development plays a key
role in human and capital development thereby
contributing to economic development. Many
developing countries suffer from failures deficien-
cies in their financial market. The vast majority of
people do not have access to capital. In a world
where competition for investment prevails, devel-
oping economies must be able to offer sound
financial systems, to attract their share of global
financial flows and to allocate these funds in a way
that promotes employment creation and econom-
ic growth. Hence, finance and financial sector
issues are an integral part of employment promo-
tion and the Decent Work agenda.
WHAT: The Social Finance Programme has a board
range of services. It responds to requests for infor-
mation, advices and supports institutions, and
works out to improve the access to financial serv-
ices. As the ILO focal point on microfinance, the
Programme has a mainstreaming function for the
office, and coordinates ILO work related to the
financial sector.
HOW: The Social Finance Programme achieves its
objectives by
• Supporting research and training by providing
advisory services for private and public organiza-
tions;
• Managing technical cooperation projects;
• Disseminating information on current issues
about the social dimension of finance;
• Representing the ILO and international fora and
co-operating with other microfinance agencies.
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